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Abstract 
In an effort to align sources with requirements, the Department of Defense 
has implemented initiatives that mirror industry’s strategic sourcing practices. These 
initiatives include Consolidated Purchasing, Commodity Councils and 
Regionalization. This project will examine a successful Commodity Council (CC), a 
failed CC, and one in the early stages of development.  We will seek characteristics 
common to both successful and unsuccessful councils, as well as characteristics 
that differentiate the outcomes.  We will include a brief history of strategic sourcing 
as a long-term supply-chain management solution in the private sector; the impetus 
behind AF implementation of strategic sourcing through CCs; associated 
transactions costs; and, finally, the resource management practices necessary to 
move beyond theory to practical application. The results are illustrated in a case 
study which will provide a template for successful implementation. 
Keywords: Commodity Council, Contracting, Strategic Sourcing, Strategic 
Purchasing, Transaction Cost Analysis, Transaction Cost Economics, Air Force, 
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As the Department of Defense (DoD) strives to enhance its warfighting 
capability on a global front, the need to provide world-class support is intensifying.  
Within dynamic political, economic, and military environments, the service branches 
must increase the capabilities and support provided to the warfighter.  All branches 
are confronted with determining how best to support their unique missions in 
dynamic environments with scarce resources.   
Scarce resources are not unique to the DoD. The commercial landscape has 
evolved into a global environment—requiring companies to transform their business 
strategies to maintain competitive advantage.  By examining how commercial 
industry deals with these issues, the DoD and the individual services can begin to 
adopt new business practices that are more in-line with industry.  One of commercial 
industry’s current initiatives to realize competitive advantage is strategic sourcing. 
This strategy provides the potential to realize the cost savings necessary to 
remaining competitive.  To save on its unique costs, the DoD has implemented 
initiatives that closely mirror strategic sourcing practices found in commercial 
industry. 
In 2005, 45% of the Air Force budget ($55 billion) was spent procuring 
equipment and support (Air force contracting strategic plan, 2005; Lorenz, n.d.).  To 
achieve the Air Force contracting vision of: “Agile sourcing through innovative 
strategic solutions developed by multi-skilled professionals who anticipate and 
deliver warfighting capabilities” (Air force contracting strategic plan, 2005), the 
acquisition community needs to understand industry practices, transform and adapt 
those practices applicable to the government arena, and implement them through 
strategic alliances.   The following sections serve to highlight the chapters in the 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the global market becomes more competitive, commercial industries strive 
to gain, or maintain, competitive advantage.  One avenue for achieving this is 
through strategic alliances.  Emerging theories on Procurement and Supply Chain 
Management (PSCM), strategic alliances, joint ventures, and lean initiatives have 
begun to shift procurement activities from a tactical to a more strategic function 
within industry.  In order to effectively implement strategic alliances, a company must 
consider procurement to be an integral part of the overall business strategy.  
Strategic alliances result in long-term commitments of both personnel and monetary 
resources to ensure both the buyer and supplier benefit from the relationship. These 
alliances have potential to drive down costs, improve productivity, and increase 
margins. However, these choices have consequences; companies must weigh all 
factors before embarking on such ventures. 
Many factors must be considered prior to entering into an alliance.  These 
factors include, but are not limited to: core competencies, transaction costs, PSCM, 
relationship management, long-term advantages/disadvantages, cost savings, 
integration, and risk management.  A company must determine if strategic alliances 
help provide a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Until 2003, with the implementation of the Air Force Information Technology 
Commodity Council (AFITCC), the service approached buying almost entirely as a 
tactical activity.  In 2003, the Air Force began to closely examine the way it 
performed procurement functions.  Recent mandates by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) are directing the Air Force, and the DoD as a whole, to “identify 
[…] commodities that could be purchased more effectively and efficiently through the 
application of strategic sourcing” (Johnson 2005, p. 1). This policy is inconsistent 
with the DoD’s overarching policy, instructions and regulations that push 
procurement activities down to the operational, or decentralized, level.  Only in the 
case of major weapon system platforms has the service seriously considered long-
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Strategic sourcing is the current trend in commercial industry and, as 
indicated by current OMB directives, the future for federal procurement.  To 
effectively transform federal procurement activities from the tactical to the strategic 
level, the DoD and the Air Force must adjust their orientation to buyers’ needs and 
supplier capabilities.  This requires the services to realign procurement activities, 
refine funding allocation processes, and ensure proper people and skill sets are in 
place. 
C. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Current directives are driving the Air Force to pursue commodity council 
possibilities.  The Air Force must determine how to meet OMB directives within 
current guidelines for procurement, while aligning strategic sourcing decisions to the 
best interests of the service as a whole.  This research will examine how well the Air 
Force is currently implementing OMB directives through commodity councils.  It will 
also examine trends and obstacles experienced within the commercial industry. 
The research will help the Air Force determine the way ahead by investigating 
the following:   
 Is federal procurement capable of performing strategic sourcing 
effectively, considering the Federal Government is not a profit-oriented 
organization?   
 Are the incentives of the Government the same as commercial firms?   
 If not, is the Government’s incentive structure adequate to be 
successful in this arena?   
Other questions asked include:  
 What makes commodity councils successful?   
 What factors make commodity councils fail?   
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 Are the correct commodities and services selected for strategic 
sourcing?   
 Is Air Force leadership helping commodity councils succeed? 
 Are procurement professionals properly trained to achieve success?   
 Is the Air Force’s acquisition strategy aligned with current Federal 
guidelines, or does it need to be tailored?   
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study was conducted using literature reviews, qualitative interviews, and 
comparative analysis.  Industry best practices were compiled to establish a 
benchmark for successful implementation of strategic alliances in the Air Force.  
This research examined three commodity councils: one considered a success, one a 
failure, and one in the early stages of development.  The interview results were used 
in a comparative analysis case study method (Yin, 2003) to determine common 
practices, as well as differences, within these councils.   
This data was compared to industry best practices to indicate strengths, 
weaknesses, and potential pitfalls of current Air Force practices.  The results of this 
data were compiled to suggest means for successful implementation of strategic 
sourcing commodity councils within the Air Force. 
E. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Brief backgrounds on the three commodity councils researched will be 
addressed; the study will also include a brief overview and discussion of the Air 
Force strategic sourcing position, a snapshot of current commodity councils and 
progress toward Air Force goals, and an idea of the future of strategic sourcing in 
the Air Force.  Responses to interview questions will be addressed in order to 
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F. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Specific recommendations for the Air Force in regards to commodity council 
practices are discussed in the final chapter.  These practices are compared against 
industry practices to formulate a roadmap for successful strategic alliances 
implemented through commodity councils.  This section also includes some of the 
limitations in this research, as well as future areas of research.  The limitations of 
this research project were time, funding, comparison of commodity councils 
available within the Air Force, and the limited number of councils currently available 
for comparison. Future areas for research  
include commodity council determination factors, utilizing best business practices, 
overall strategic sourcing opportunities, other approaches to strategic sourcing, and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of strategic sourcing as 
it relates to commercial industry and government practices.  It addresses topics 
common to both industry and government—such as transaction cost economics, 
supply chain management, partnerships and alliances.  Finally, this chapter will 
examine the theory and practice of strategic sourcing and its application within the 
government.  It will discuss government-specific topics to include Air Force 
initiatives, OMB directives, and the implementation of commodity councils.  
B. STRATEGIC SOURCING 
Strategic sourcing is a new term for a very old philosophy.  In order to 
understand the practicality of strategic sourcing in today’s marketplace, one must 
first understand how sourcing has transformed.  Sourcing began in a decentralized 
format at the tactical level, with individual organizations purchasing commodities to 
meet their specific needs.  Sourcing is evolving into a highly sophisticated strategy at 
the corporate level affecting cost, productivity, and performance. 
In the past, finding sources of supply typically involved finding suppliers who 
could provide the desired product or service and then deciding who provided it at the 
lowest cost.  As organizations begin looking more at total lifecycle cost and less at 
purchase price as the major factor in the decision process, it becomes imperative for 
firms to make a best-value decision.  This thought process brings the supplier into 
the folds of the company—as a subsidiary, not just an outsider.  Examples of this 
trace back to the keiretsu models from the Meiji period (1868-1912), when Japanese 
corporations were structured around hierarchy, loyalty, and dependency 
(Schoonmaker & Osborn, 2007).  Under this philosophy, large corporations owned 
shares of smaller organizations.  To effectively maintain control of all aspects of the 
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organizations, thus creating wealth for all parties.  A full discussion of how keiretsu 
models are structured, as well as a comparison to the competitive market model, 
can be found in Appendix C.  
The keiretsu model was not viewed as viable in the western world, in large 
part because of anti-collusion laws and the capitalist firm structure.  In competitive 
markets, as practiced in the United States, firms can enter or exit the market at will.  
Firms are concerned with individual goals as opposed to the goals of a 
conglomerate.  As the marketplace changed, from a domestic to a global 
environment, companies needed to find new ways to stay competitive.  Theories 
such as keiretsu, Total Quality Management, and Lean Management created 
paradigm shifts within companies hoping to leverage their internal capabilities.  
These capabilities are described by Hart, in Carr’s work, as consisting of 
procurement, technology, design, production, distribution and service (Carr & 
Pearson, 2002).   
In order to effectively leverage their capabilities, businesses must determine 
what products or services are best developed internally, and which should be 
obtained through external sources.  In general, four sourcing strategies are available 
to all players in the market: make-or-buy, outsourcing, in sourcing, and strategic 
sourcing (Oberoi & Khamba, 2005).  The remainder of this project will focus on 
strategic sourcing and its relation to commodity councils within the DoD and, 
specifically, the Air Force. 
The idea of strategic sourcing was born out of two needs.  As Kocabasoglu 
stated, “introduction of new manufacturing and information technologies prompted a 
need to closely align buying cycles with production requirements […] [C]ost 
containment started to become an absolute necessity to remain competitive” 
(Kocabasoglu & Suresh, 2006 p. 4).   However, there is no consistent definition of 
strategic sourcing in the literature.  Various definitions found are described in Table 
1.  For purposes of this project, strategic sourcing is synonymous with strategic 
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implementing, evaluating, and controlling strategies and operating purchasing 
decisions for directing all activities of the purchasing function toward opportunities 
consistent with the firm’s capabilities to achieve its long-term goals” (Zsidisin, Ellram 
& Ogden, 2003 p. 134).  
Definitions Authors 
1. “The process of planning, implementing, evaluating, and 
controlling strategies and operating purchasing 
decisions for directing all activities of the purchasing 
function toward opportunities consistent with the firm’s 
capabilities to achieve its long-term goals.”   
Zsidisin and Ellram, 2001 p.632, as attributed 
to Carr and Smeltzer, 1997  
2. “The process of determining competencies provided by 
this supplier network contain a high degree of 
knowledge and are those most complementary to in-
house core competencies.” 
Oberoi and Khamba, 2005 p. 278 
3. “A systematic process that begins with thorough 
analysis of spend across an enterprise and then 
organizes that spend focusing on selected suppliers for 
best results on cost, product development, quality and 
services” 
Smock, 2004 p. 15 
4. “A logical and systematic process for managing and 
prioritizing an organization’s spending.” 
Newhart, 2006 p. 26 
5. “The collaborative and structured process of critically 
analyzing an organization’s spending and using this 
information to make business decisions about acquiring 
commodities and services more effectively and 
efficiently.” 
Johnson, 2005 p. 1 
6. “The leveraging of an organization’s buying power to 
obtain goods and services at better terms and 
conditions over their life cycle.” 
Caporal, 2006 p. 3 
7. “The process of planning, evaluating, implementing, and 
controlling highly important and routine sourcing 
decisions.” 
Carr and Pearson, 2002 p. 1032, as attributed 
to Carr and Smeltzer, 1997 
8. “The process of designing and managing supply 
networks in line with operational and organizational 
performance objectives.” 
Kocabasoglu and Suresh, 2006 p. 4, as 
attributed to Narasimhan and Das, 1999 
9. “Process of analysis of the internal and external 
environment via industry analysis, vendor analysis, 
business need assessment, competitive analysis, and 
supply/demand forecasting.” 
Oberoi and Khamba, 2005 p. 279, as 
attributed to Carr and Smeltzer, 1997, and 
Narasimhan and Das, 1999 
10. “The use of supplier competencies to achieve flexibility 
goals through: establishing relationships with suppliers 
with fast response capabilities to schedule or design 
changes; and formal incorporation of supplier 
technological capabilities in design, engineering, and 
manufacturing strategies.” 
Narasimhan and Das, 1999 p. 692 
11. “An initiative to build competitive advantage through 
early supplier involvement in product engineering, 
sharing of supplier technology, and supplier assistance 
in developing product and process improvement.” 
Narasimhan and Das, 1999 p. 685, as 
attributed to Carter and Narasimhan, 1990 
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Just as the current body of research uses varying definitions of strategic 
sourcing, there are many different theories about how to implement strategic 
sourcing successfully.  Several sources present their approaches in a step-by-step 
format.  These range from the fifteen-step and eight-step approach by the Institute of 
Management and Administration (IOMA) to the three-step approach by Newhart.  








IOMA 15 Step IOMA 8 Step Newhart 3 Step 
1. Understand different 
business/corporate cultures 
involved 
2. Identify external/internal factors 
that work for/against effort 
3. Determine annual spend 
members 
4. Ascertain percentage of spend 
currently under contract or 
obtained through strategic 
sourcing 
5. Calculate savings potential 
through developing new 
procurement organization 
6. Establish personal/team 
credibility 
7. Develop customer and 
purchasing involvement 
8. Survey all existing procurement-
related systems 
9. Create a business case 
10. Develop strategic vision 
statement/schedule 
11. Evaluate existing procurement 
staff skills 
12. Role of suppliers 
13. Involvement of Senior 
Management 
14. Implementation of strategic plan 
15. Formulating metrics to track 
results achieved by new 
procurement organization 
1. Access High-level 
spend analysis 
2. Create sourcing 
teams 
3. Evaluate needs, 
develop strategy 
4. Gather market 
information 
5. Develop supplier 
portfolio 
6. “To be” or future state 
7. Negotiating and 
selecting suppliers 
8. Supplier relationship 
management/mainten
ance 
1. Understand commodity 
and how it is procured 
2. Market research and 
Industry analysis 
3. Develop a commodity 
strategy with 
recommendations of 
specific action for both 
near term and long term to 
procure services in a more 
efficient manner 
 
Table 2. Strategic Sourcing Process Steps 
(After IOMA, 2003; IOMA, 2005; Newhart, 2006) 
All three of these approaches to successful strategic purchasing have certain 
commonalities.  They include spend analysis, market research, and strategy 
development.  Additional research identifies other key factors—such as the 
positioning of the purchasing function at a strategic level, senior-level management 
support throughout the process, early supplier involvement, and the cultivation of 
buyer and supplier relationships based on trust (Oberoi & Khamba, 2005; Ellram & 
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As more firms’ purchasing functions evolve from short-term individual 
transactions towards strategic practices, they recognize many benefits associated 
with long-term goal achievement.  Proponents for strategic sourcing demonstrate 
benefits of forming alliances within the supply base to include: shorter lead times, 
cost reduction, improved support service from suppliers, increased capacity, greater 
efficiency, heightened competition from a broadened pool of qualified suppliers, 
accurate pricing, and more accurate measurements of performance (Olorunniwo & 
Hartfield, 2001; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001; Dupray, 2005).  Within the government 
specifically, proponents see the benefits as reduction in cost per unit, change in 
consumption and volume, improved operating efficiency, and improved focus on 
socio-economic goals (SAF/AQC, 2005, November 5). 
Opponents of strategic sourcing offer valid reasons for concern.  Just as there 
are many benefits associated with implementing these strategies, there are several 
drawbacks that must be considered.  Some of these include a reduction in the 
supply base, loss of freedom to change sources, switching costs, and reduced 
competition (to include small businesses) (Olorunniwo & Hartfield, 2001; Rogin, 
2006).  Both parties also face increased risk by entering into an alliance, as each is 
possibly subject to hold-up or opportunistic behavior by the partner (Franck, 2004).  
Additionally, these alliances may well create bi-lateral monopolies—thwarting new 
entrants and possibly decreasing innovation and technology.  Finally, there are 
transaction costs associated with long-term relationships with a limited supplier 
base.  The achievement of significant cost savings and efficiencies requires 
oversight of the partners.  This requires committing the time and effort of resources 
which could be better used elsewhere (Franck, 2004).  Transaction costs are 
discussed in more depth in the following section of this chapter. 
In pursuit of strategic goals, organizations need to weigh both the benefits 
and risks of all sourcing strategies to determine the best solution to meet their 
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connotations, it continues to gain momentum as a possible solution to meet the 
diverse threats present within the marketplace.  
C. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
The theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) was first introduced by 
Ronald Coase in 1937.  Coase’s statement, “a firm will tend to expand until the costs 
of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the cost of 
carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or 
the costs of organizing in another firm” (Coase, 1937 p. 395), was the impetus 
behind this theory.  However, TCE was not specifically applied in the marketplace 
until forty years later, when it was further developed by Oliver Williamson in the 
1970’s.   Williamson described TCE as, “an interdisciplinary undertaking that joins 
economics with aspects of organization theory and overlaps extensively with 
contract law” (Williamson, 1979 p. 261). 
Transaction costs can be defined very basically as the costs of carrying out 
any type of exchange within the market (Hobbs, 1996).  More specifically, the 
literature offers three categories of transaction costs: information, negotiation and 
monitoring costs.  The costs are not generally recognized in financial accounting 
methods and are often hard to measure.  The theory of TCE has been widely 
publicized in literature; however, it is still not widely applied by organizations making 
sourcing decisions, strategic or otherwise (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
 The theory of TCE has four foundational elements: bounded rationality, 
opportunism, asset specificity and informational asymmetry (Williamson, 1989).  
Bounded rationality is explained as behavior that is intended to be rational but has 
limits (Williamson, 1981).  The fact that individuals are self-seeking and devious is 
what creates opportunism (Williamson, 1989).  Asset specificity occurs when one 
firm makes investments in people, capital or other areas that are specific to a 
particular transaction or relationship, and those investments hold virtually no value 
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informational asymmetry.   Informational asymmetry is the idea that organizations 
are privy to different information, and not all players in the market have identical or 
perfect information.   
Williamson proposed that TCE could be applied to three specific areas: 
career marriage, corporate finance and non-standard commercial contracting 
(Williamson, 1989).  This project will focus on TCE as it applies to non-standard 
commercial contracting and strategic sourcing.  TCE provides a firm a method for 
determining which transactions need to be internalized and which can be 
strategically sourced (Murray, Kotabe & Wildt, 1995). 
TCE ensures the costs of each transaction are factored into the sourcing 
decision process.  Sourcing and purchasing decisions normally examine those items 
that can be accounted for: e.g., production costs, labor costs, raw materials, 
overhead, and tooling.  When a firm utilizes TCE in its analysis, then items such as 
contract negotiation costs, oversight, opportunity costs, relationship management 
costs, and contract administration are also considered.  These items cannot 
generally be quantified in specific dollar amounts; however, this limitation does not 
diminish the role these items should play in the decision process.   
There are transaction costs with every type of sourcing decision.  These costs 
increase or decrease as a firm moves through the spectrum of supplier relationships: 
from a transaction-by-transaction relationship, to an arm’s length relationship, and 
finally to that of a strategic sourcing relationship.  For TCE to be effectively utilized in 
the decision-making process, all transaction costs need to be examined. Transaction 
costs should be evaluated from all perspectives.  Therefore, firms should examine 
transaction costs as they apply to each individual purchase, as well as their 
application to strategic supplier relationships. 
When a decision to strategically source is made, there are additional costs 
associated with the contractual agreement between the buyer and supplier.  
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costs.  These costs include drafting, revising, negotiating, re-negotiating, 
administering, and monitoring the contract (Franck, 2004; Williamson, 1981).   
Clearly, deciding to enter into a strategic sourcing relationship is not the best 
solution for the organization if the transaction costs of a strategic sourcing 
relationship are higher than the production cost savings.   
Even though there is a strong foundation for the application of TCE to 
sourcing decisions, industry has been slow to respond.  This might be partially due 
to transaction costs not being easily measurable (Hobbs, 1996).  Even though this 
theory has not been fully embraced in industry, it is imperative that TCE be utilized 
by the government (specifically the DoD and the Air Force) when it considers what 
commodities to strategically source. 
D. SUPPLIER/BUYER RELATIONSHIPS 
In individual transactions, where cost is the primary driver, developing 
relationships between the buyers and suppliers is not essential to achieve desired 
results.  Yet, in strategic sourcing, developing relationships is critical to the process, 
even though these relationships come at an expense to both parties. 
The process of selecting the right supplier is one of the most critical steps in 
developing long-term supplier relationships.  Literature shows supplier selection is 
not only based on the type of supplier, but on the particular commodity and the 
importance of the commodity to the organization (Ausink, Baldwin & Paul, 2004; 
Oberoi & Khamba, 2005).  Effectively evaluating suppliers is considered to be 
essential, but is not always properly implemented.  Research shows that supplier 
evaluations are generally based only on price, quality and delivery; however, other 
factors such as reliability, trust, communication, commitment to a long-term alliance, 
supplier financial stability, and cultural compatibility also need to be considered 
when contemplating strategic sourcing (Ellram, 1995; Oberoi & Khamba, 2005; 
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criteria prior to selecting potential suppliers in order to mitigate the risks and 
transaction costs associated with strategic alliances. 
Research reveals there are vulnerabilities, risks and costs commonly 
associated with strategic alliances.  When a strategic alliance is formed, 
organizations are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by both parties.  Investment in 
specific assets may create a bi-lateral monopoly between buyer and seller 
(Williamson, 1981).  Asset specificity enables suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors 
through their ability to hold-up the buyer.  It allows them to have power in terms of 
price and availability (Franck, 2004; Murray et al., 1995).  Buyers also possess the 
ability to hold-up the suppliers by changing specifications, decreasing or increasing 
production requirements, or both.  Supplier hold-up is possible because the 
investments made by the supplier have limited or no value with a different buyer 
(Murray et al., 1995).  This hinders the suppliers’ ability to readily disengage from 
this alliance or shift production elsewhere.  Researchers cite well-crafted, detailed 
contracts as means to limit these vulnerabilities and mitigate the cost and risk of 
legal enforcement and litigation (Franck, 2004; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005).   
The literature that addresses disadvantages associated with alliances 
contains heavy emphasis on opportunistic behavior and asset specificity.  Other 
risks of strategic alliances referenced in literature are: loss of corporate knowledge 
(Rossetti & Choi, 2005), switching costs (Olorunniwo & Hartfield, 2001), decreased 
competition, and information sharing (Jennings, 2002).  
A significant amount of research concludes there are many benefits 
associated with strategic alliances.  Asset specificity, previously noted as a negative 
aspect of long-term relationships, is also beneficial.  The potential for a supplier, who 
is heavily invested in specific assets, to exhibit opportunistic behavior is inhibited if 
the long-term gains in the relationship outweigh the gains possible in other 
opportunities (Kaufman, Wood & Theyel, 2000; Kocabasoglu & Suresh, 2006; Wuyts 
& Geyskens, 2005).  Strategic partnering fosters an environment in which 
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flow allows for a better understanding of each others’ capabilities, behaviors and 
motives (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001). This understanding cultivates mutual trust, which 
improves the chances of a competitive advantage for each organization and an 
overall collaborative advantage (Murray, 2001; Paulraj & Chen, 2005).  Gillen sums 
up these effects very appropriately by stating, “Communication and collaboration are 
therefore key to the success of the councils” (Gillen, 2006).    
Other benefits addressed in literature are cost reduction, improved service 
and reliability (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001), increased profits (Burt, 1989), information 
sharing, improved innovation and technologies (Ellram, 1995; Handfield, Krause, 
Scannell & Monczka, 2000), and risk sharing (Ellram, 1995; Oberoi & Khamba, 
2005). 
There are references to the downsides of strategic alliances; however, the 
preponderance of the literature indicates the benefits of strategic partnerships 
outweigh the risks.  The DoD has recognized these benefits and has decided 
strategic sourcing improves mission accomplishment.   
E. DIRECTIVES 
The Federal Government is consistently challenged to maximize the value of 
each dollar spent (Johnson, 2005).  Since industry has also been forced to adapt to 
an ever-changing market and resources continue to become scarcer, strategic 
sourcing has gained widespread acceptance as a means of improving efficiency, 
cutting costs, and increasing profits.  In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) issued a memorandum to all Chief Acquisition Officers (CAO), Chief 
Financial Officers (CFO), and Chief Information Officers (CIO) within the Federal 
Government, stating the Government must leverage the almost $300 billion it 
spends on goods and services each year to the maximum extent possible through 
strategic sourcing.  These three officers within each agency of the government have 
been tasked for the overall development and implementation of their respective 
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The memorandum specifically mandated each agency, by October 1, 2005, 
“identify no fewer than three commodities that could be purchased more effectively 
and efficiently through the application of strategic sourcing.”  Agencies were allowed 
to report strategic sourcing efforts already initiated (Johnson, 2005 p. 1).  The OMB 
also placed the onus on these individuals to develop the agencies’ strategic sourcing 
plans, to be cognizant of cost and performance goals while ensuring compliance 
with regulatory statutes and socio-economic goals.  Although strategic sourcing has 
many benefits, it directly contradicts many current acquisition regulations.  These 
mandates include: Buy American Act, Small Business Act, subsequent Small 
Business Reauthorization Acts, and the Javits Wagner O’Day Act. 
In addition to these requirements listed above, agencies must annually report 
to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) regarding their strategic 
sourcing initiatives.  They must identify any reductions in the prices of goods and 
services, business cost reductions, performance improvements, and changes in 
achieving socio-economic goals (OMB memorandum, 2005, May 20).  Each agency 
is tasked to input all requested data into the OMB Competitive Sourcing Tracking 
System.  These results are consolidated and reported annually to Congress in 
accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 (Dennett, 2006).  
Higher acquisition costs (due to structural inefficiencies, budgeting and 
staffing limitations, and external oversight) forced the DoD to find more efficient and 
effective ways to meet its mission (DoD-wide strategic sourcing, 2005).  Following 
industry best practices, a DoD-Wide Strategic Sourcing (DWSS) program was 
developed in 2003, well ahead of the 2005 OMB suspense.  To further refine its 
commitment to strategic sourcing, the DoD also developed a Concept of Operations 
(CONOP); it was implemented in January, 2005.  This document provides guidance 
for DoD agencies to achieve strategic sourcing initiatives.   
The Air Force was on the cutting edge of the strategic sourcing movement 
and had already initiated several commodity councils at the enterprise and 
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Medical Services Commodity Council (MSCC) in 2004.  At the command level, Air 
Force Material Command (AFMC) has initiated eight commodity councils at the Air 
Logistics Centers (Report to OMB, 2006).         
In order to promote implementation, the Air Force developed Informational 
Guidance (IG) in the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation (AFFAR).  
IG5307.104-93, Commodity Council Implementation and Operations, solidified the 
Air Force commitment to strategic sourcing and provided a tangible tool to guide the 
process.  
F. COMMODITY COUNCIL 
The term commodity council is a generic definition used to describe a group 
from different functions within an organization tasked to consolidate needs up to the 
corporate level.  The Secretary of the Air Force (SAF) CONOP defines a commodity 
council as “a cross functional group charged with formulating a centralized 
purchasing strategy and establishing centralized contracts for enterprise wide 
requirements for a selected commodity grouping” (Reese & Hansen, 2003 p. 1).  
This is also the definition used by industry.  For purposes of this research, 
commodity refers to goods or services and not to an expendable or non-complex 
item (Reese & Hansen, 2003).  
The composition of a commodity council may vary depending on the size and 
complexity of the procurement.  According to Gillen, “the council should contain 
commodity expertise, as well as, knowledge in maintenance, engineering, 
procurement, technology, market analysis, project management, business 
processes, and acquisition strategy and analysis” (Gillen, 2006 p. 35). For the 
council to function effectively, all members must possess a variety of skills common 
to successful teams.   
Literature reviews of commercial-sector commodity councils have shown 
membership on a council requires each individual to possess skill sets in computing, 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 20 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
analysis, technical contracting, and purchasing and supply management cost 
analysis (Ausink et al., 2004).  A good example of a corporation which adeptly 
analyzes necessary qualifications for all levels of buyers within commercial firms is 
BMW.  Its analysis revealed over one thousand areas for improvement, including 
linguistics, technical knowledge, and contract law (Wolf, 2005).  It even created a 
cost-engineering function with engineers who worked in purchasing. Although these 
engineers didn’t buy anything, they provided specialized knowledge in particular 
areas of expertise (Wolf, 2005). 
The roles and responsibilities of the commodity council also vary across 
commodities and organizations.  Research has shown commodity councils in 
industry have no standard set of procedures to follow (Irvine, 2005).  This allows 
businesses within industry to develop councils to meet specific commodity needs as 
they arise.  This lack of structure poses some potential drawbacks as it does not 
clearly define the roles of the council or the responsibilities of the individual 
members.  Furthermore, it does not establish a reporting hierarchy or define metrics 
to indicate success or failure.   
To remedy this lack of structure, the Air Force issued Informational Guidance 
for implementing and operating a commodity council.  This document states the 
primary purpose of the council is to develop strategies at the enterprise level for the 
specific commodity group through proper execution at the appropriate level.  This is 
accomplished by team members closely watching industry trends, monitoring 
supplier performance, and tracking requirements.  Other responsibilities outlined in 
the guide include creating and maintaining supplier relationships, integrating 
suppliers into the business operations, seeking standardization and commonality of 
the requirements, using enterprise-wide volume as a leveraging tool, reducing costs 
throughout the supply chain, developing specific guidelines, strategies and 
scorecards for each commodity group, determining the level of effort to be 
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Force organizational chart for a commodity council, outlining its composition and 
decision-making hierarchy. 
Figure 1. Commodity Council Organization Chart 
(From SAF/AQC, 2005, November 5) 
The processes for commodity councils also vary.  Avery offers a process 
consisting of five phases (Avery, 1999): 
Phase I–Investigate, analyze, and formulate commodity strategy; solicit upper 
management support and identify key users; estimate savings 
potential. 
Phase II–Select suppliers; benchmark with industry’s best; develop and issue 
RFP.  
Phase III–Negotiate terms and conditions and develop contract; make final 
selection, sign contract, and issue order. 
Phase IV–Develop implementation plan with supplier(s); report total cost of 
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Phase V–Continuous improvement; supplier management activities; perform 
periodic reviews of supplier performance. 
Similarly, Monczka, Trent and Handfield (2005) offer a general commodity 
council process consisting of seven steps.  This process is presented in Figure 2.  
The Air Force recommends a continuous eight-step process of constant 
improvement, which is in a diagram format similar to Monczka’s.  Figure 3 shows 
how the Air Force process starts with reviewing the current strategy and completes 
the cycle with monitoring and improving the implemented strategy.  
 
Figure 2. Industry Process Chart 
(From Monczka et al., 2005)
1. Define business 
unit requirements. 









4. Set goals and 
conduct analysis. 
5. Develop sourcing 
strategy and 









Figure 3. Air Force Commodity Council Process  
(From FarSite, 2006) 
Commodity councils are designed to examine requirements at the unit level 
and to decide what can feasibly be centralized at the enterprise level.  Centralizing 
creates economies of scale as well as leverage.  As some researchers noted, this is 
no different than mutual funds, wholesale club memberships, or buying twelve packs 
instead of six packs (Reese & Pohlman, 2005). With government buyers spending 
25% of the gross national product (Callender & Matthews, 2000), and operational 
and sustainment spending accounting for over 42% of the Air Force budget (Reese 
& Pohlman, 2005), centralizing commodities that are currently decentralized could 
increase efficiency and improve effectiveness though volume contracts.   
The use of commodity councils in strategic sourcing has achieved significant 
savings.  In 2001, ChevronTexaco used strategic purchasing to save 39.3% in office 
supply costs and 22.4% in furniture costs.  They also showed savings of $10.3 
million in information technology hardware (Reese & Pohlman, 2005).  In the federal 
sector, the Department of Homeland Security’s commodity council for weapons and 
ammunition competitively awarded two contracts, one small and one large, to supply 
65,000 firearms in various calibers and sizes over the next five years.  The results 





























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
Morton, 2006).  Finally, the AFITCC “saved $4 million in 2003 by analyzing and 
consolidating desktop and notebook computer purchases” (Matthews, 2005). 
Air Force commodity councils are charged with developing effective 
strategies.  In order to be successful, each council must examine potential suppliers 
at the local and global level, determine the number of suppliers that will receive 
awards and the amount each supplier will receive, create plans to develop the 
suppliers’ abilities, develop methodologies for supplier relationships, determine the 
contractual type, length, and terms and conditions, and ensure socio-economic 
programs are adequately incorporated (FarSite, 2006).  These responsibilities 
highlight the need for experts within the specific commodity group.  As noted in the 
DoD strategic sourcing CONOP, “success of the program is contingent on its ability 
to effectively operate within the larger DoD acquisition environment and to engage 
key stakeholders in the planning and implementation of approved commodity 
sourcing strategies” (DoD-wide strategic sourcing, 2005 p. 9). 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the background information that will serve as the 
foundation of our research project.  The literature reviewed allows us to begin 
answering the questions posed in Chapter I.  The review examined the history and 
implementation of strategic sourcing in both industry as well as the Air Force.  It also 
addressed how transaction costs and relationship management factor into the 
strategic sourcing process, as well as provided an overview of Government 
directives and initiatives.  This chapter concluded with the commodity council 
process, roles and responsibilities, and Air Force implementation, which is the 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and detail the research objectives 
and the methods utilized in this study.  Specifically, it will discuss the case study 
methodology that was followed in order to formulate the research objectives, create 
the interview questions, and collect the data.  It will also discuss the factors that 
ensure the reliability/validity of the data that was collected, as well as how the data 
was analyzed.   
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective is to conduct comparative case studies of differing commodity 
councils within the current Air Force environment. Yin validates this approach by 
stating, “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the 
experiment, does not represent a “sample,” and in doing a case study, your goal will 
be to expand and generalize theories […] and not to enumerate frequencies” (Yin, 
2003 p. 10).  The results are compared to current industry practices in order to 
provide a roadmap for successful implementation of the commodity council concept 
within the Air Force.  
Data was collected from Air Force commodity councils in varying stages of 
growth and implementation.  The research focuses on a council that is considered a 
success, one that is viewed as a failure and one that is just emerging.  Eisenhardt 
discusses the strengths of using commonalities and differences in both cross-case 
and within-case approaches (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Comparing and contrasting the 
various characteristics of each council will provide a framework for in-depth analysis 
of the factors contributing to the success (or lack thereof) of commodity councils 
within the Air Force.  The use of commodity councils is just one method the Air 
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this method, this research will identify key characteristics that must be present to 
ensure commodity council success.       
In order to effectively examine the success of commodity councils within the 
Air Force, an overview of industry best practices was presented and discussed.  The 
discussion of industry best practices highlights instances of success within industry, 
which we can then benchmark.  It also identifies industry practices that can not and 
should not be applied within the public sector.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Yin describes the case study strategy as applicable when the required 
answers to research question are how or why a phenomenon occurred.  It is best 
suited when focusing on contemporary events rather than on the control of 
behavioral events (Yin, 2003).  The research methods utilized in this project meet 
the criteria Yin describes, as the objective is to answer the questions of how and 
why commodity councils in the Air Force succeed or fail.  As the implementation of 
commodity councils has already occurred, the focus of the research was aimed at 
discovering the processes undertaken vice controlling the individual events and 
outcomes.     
Choosing the case study methodology enabled the researchers to examine 
the subject from many perspectives, due to the multitude of resources at their 
disposal. These resources include: best practices within industry, subject-matter 
experts, commodity council team members, directives, and theory.  This systemic 
approach is reinforced by Yin’s statement: “the case study’s unique strength is its 
ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews and 
observations—beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study” 
(Yin, 2003 p. 8). 
To ensure the subject was thoroughly examined, the research team chose to 
investigate three commodity councils at the enterprise-wide level within the Air 
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needs across the entire Air Force—versus a tactical procurement approach at the 
individual unit levels.  Polonsky, Waller and Eisenhardt reinforce this approach of 
examining several cases (Polonsky & Waller, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The research team examined documents, conducted interviews, and 
observed processes in an effort to analyze and present evidence in a qualitative 
fashion.  In order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the issues faced by the 
Air Force commodity councils, the case study methodology was determined to be 
the most effective approach for this research.     
D. DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of commodity councils and 
their effectiveness within the Air Force, it was necessary to collect data using 
multiple techniques.  According to Yin:  
The case study […] copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, 
and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis. (Yin, 2003 pp. 13-14) 
The triangulation of data for this research included: literature review, 
examination of critical government directives and guidance documents, and 
transcriptions of interviews with senior DoD and Air Force personnel and commodity 
council team members. 
Interviewees at the DoD and Air Force levels were selected based on their 
specific positions within the strategic sourcing arena of defense procurement.  
Interviews were conducted with personnel in a variety of positions across the 
commodity councils to ensure various disciplines within the teams were adequately 
represented.  As Polonsky noted, “The semi structured interview [...] gives you the 
opportunity to gather in-depth responses that reflect the insights of the interviewee.  
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Waller, 2005 p. 131).  All interviews were conducted in accordance with the Naval 
Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board requirements to ensure the 
confidentiality of all participants.  The responses are presented anonymously, and 
respondents are not identified by name or job title.   
Utilizing the methods, theories, initiatives, and directives presented in the 
literature review, a preliminary set of interview questions was established.  After 
discussions with subject-matter experts and meetings with research advisors, a final 
version of interview questions was developed.  The interview questions are attached 
as Appendix A and B.  All interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed by 
an outside agency.  The transcripts from these interviews were the primary source of 
data for this research.   
The data was analyzed qualitatively utilizing both the interview results as well 
as information gathered from the literature review.  Each team member analyzed the 
data individually.  Discrepancies were addressed and resolved through the 
presentation and discussion of researchers’ interpretation of findings.  
E. RELIABILITY/VALIDITY 
Three widely used tests to ensure validity and reliability in case studies are 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2003).  Each test, the tactic 
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Figure 4. Case Study Tactics for Design Tests  
(After Yin, 2003 p. 34) 
Internal validity was assured as the researchers compared and contrasted the 
patterns that exist in each commodity council.  Government directives build a case 
for the existence of commodity councils to help achieve strategic sourcing goals.  
Each step within the commodity council process was examined to ensure a logical 
approach in progressing toward the successful implementation and continuing 
improvement of each commodity council.  To further guarantee internal validity, all 
results of the jointly collected data were analyzed individually. 
After individual analysis, any incongruent interpretations were cross-checked 
against the transcripts and discussed between the researchers in order to reach a 
final consensus.   
This confirmed the reliability of the research data.  All data collection, to 
include transcripts and digital recordings, is maintained in a database by the 
researchers and is available upon request.  
Tests Case Study Tactic Phase in which Tactic Occurs 
Internal Validity 
 Do pattern-matching 
 Do explanation-building 
 Address rival 
explanations 





External Validity  Use replication logic in multiple case studies Research design 
Reliability 
 Use case study protocol 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the research objectives of this study.  It described in 
detail the methodology used to create the interview questions, collect the data, 
ensure the reliability/validity of such data and analyze the results.  The next chapter 
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IV. INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to present results of our questionnaire.  A brief 
synopsis of each commodity council, as well as senior DoD and Air Force strategic 
sourcing organizations, is presented to provide a foundation for analysis and to 
clarify the scope of this project.  Following a synopsis of the councils, interview 
questions and responses are broken out by topic.   
B. COMMODITY COUNCILS 
This project researched three commodity councils across the Air Force.  The 
intent was to observe commodity councils at varying stages of implementation to 
determine if process improvement was being realized from one council to the next.  
This approach enabled analysis of each individual council’s structure, 
implementation, processes, and other attributes throughout the different stages.  The 
three commodity councils selected were the Air Force Medical Commodity Council 
(AFMCC), Air Mobility Command Furnishings Portfolio Commodity Council (AMC 
FPCC), and the Force Protection Commodity Council (FPCC). 
1. AFMCC 
The AFMCC was initiated in August 2004.  The council was initially developed 
as a means for acquiring clinical care services. The AFMCC is located at Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH.  At its inception, the AFMCC was designed to support all Air 
Force Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF).  This council represents a fully developed 
model.  The first award for Spiral I was issued in 2005, and Spiral II development 
began in 2006.  Interviews were conducted with four current council members and 
one additional individual no longer assigned to the council; however, this individual 
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2. AMC FPCC 
The AMC FPCC began as an enterprise-level initiative in 2006.  AMC took the 
lead on this commodity council at a regional level, since no enterprise-level support 
was obtained.  This AMC pilot effort, if successful on a regional level, will expand to 
become an Air Force-wide initiative. AMC FPCC is located at Scott AFB, IL.  The 
AMC FPCC charter was approved in early 2007, and the council is currently in the 
market research phase.  This council represents an emerging model.  Interviews 
were conducted with four current council members.   
3. FPCC 
The FPCC, located at Lackland AFB, TX, was originally organized in 2004.  
The only action completed by this council was an award for gate guards at 
numerous bases across several commands.  This commodity council disbanded 
until 2006, and a second attempt was made to form a successful council.  The new 
council never reached full development status.  It is considered to be stagnant, and 
there are no members presently assigned to the council.  This council represents an 
underdeveloped model.  Interviews were conducted with one former member and 
representatives from Air Force Headquarters.  Due to the lack of personnel available 
to interview, other information sources were utilized to formulate an analysis.   
C. DOD AND AIR FORCE STRATEGIC SOURCING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
DoD established strategic sourcing positions under the Defense Procurement 
and Acquisition Policy office in 2007.  The primary goal of this office is to develop 
policy and aid DoD agencies in implementing strategic sourcing initiatives.   
The Air Force Strategic Sourcing Office is located in Virginia and is a division 
of Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition Contracting (SAF/AQC).  The primary 
responsibility of this office is to develop strategy for implementing Strategic Sourcing 
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commodity councils, center-level commodity councils, and regionalized strategic 
purchasing.   
These two organizations provided this project with insight into overall 
business goals and acquisition strategy for the DoD and the Air Force.  The 
researchers conducted four interviews with personnel from these offices.  
D. INTERVIEW RESPONSES FOR HEADQUARTERS LEVEL 
As previously noted, responses from the headquarters questionnaire are 
presented generically and not attributable to specific individuals or positions.  
Responses are discussed below. 
1. OMB Initiative 
Qualitative responses to Q1 
As a public organization, is the Air Force capable of implementing 
Strategic Sourcing the same way as industry?  If not, how is the Air 
Force approach different? 
All respondents agree the Federal Government is capable of strategic 
sourcing; however, not in the same manner as industry.  This is due to the 
regulations, laws, and constraints imposed on how Federal funds are allocated.  All 
respondents noted industry has more flexibility, is more proactive, and has more 
freedom to decide where and when to invest its capital and resources.  Education of 
the workforce, proper training, and a strategic knowledge base were noted as major 
challenges for the Air Force.   
Qualitative responses to Q2 and Q3 
How did the Air Force come up with its initiatives to meet the OMB 
directive? 
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Three respondents noted the Air Force already had initiatives under 
development prior to the OMB directive.  All three respondents felt the only step 
necessary to meet the directive was to develop reporting procedures for those 
initiatives implemented.  Everyone agreed all initiatives implemented are still in 
effect, with new initiatives being implemented every year. One respondent noted the 
need to align and organize our workforce while ensuring its members are properly 
educated in strategic sourcing. 
2. Plan 
Qualitative responses to Q1, Q3, and Q4 
How was the Air Force Strategic Sourcing Plan (SSP) developed? 
What method of implementation was used to deliver the SSP? 
Were community best practices, both public and private, considered in 
developing the plan? 
Two respondents had no idea how the SSP was developed.  Another 
respondent noted the senior contracting leadership developed a five-year strategic 
sourcing plan.  The final respondent stated the strategic sourcing plan was a piece 
of the overarching acquisition strategic plan for the Air Force.  Only two respondents 
were aware of how the SSP was implemented.  Both stated it was publicized to the 
Major Commands (MAJCOMS) through electronic communication tools. One 
respondent thought best practices were indeed benchmarked from industry and 
other DoD agencies when the plan was developed.  
Qualitative responses to Q2 
How is IG5307.104-93 (Commodity Council Implementation and 
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One respondent noted that during the initial phase of developing a commodity 
council, the members received two days of training for implementing a council.  The 
training was not what was outlined in the IG, but did contain steps for implementing 
strategic sourcing.  When asked where these training materials came from, the 
response was they were provided by a contractor.  One respondent needed 
clarification on what the IG was.  When this was clarified, this respondent stated it 
was more of procedural information, but felt it was being utilized.  A final respondent 
thought it was utilized very well, and this tool was the baseline for developing the 
councils and the hierarchy structure.  This respondent did believe it was a 
procedural step-by-step tool. 
Qualitative responses to Q5 
What factors were used to determine which commodities were going to 
be considered for commodity councils?  TCA?  Available sources?  
SBA goals? 
All respondents highlighted spend as the sole factor in determining what 
commodities were considered for strategic sourcing.  Analysis was based on the ten 
highest spend-level items.  Opportunity assessments were conducted to determine 
feasibility of strategically sourcing these commodities.  One respondent noted the 
spend analysis information currently used was outsourced.  Neither TCA, the 
availability of sources, nor small business goals were identified by the respondents 
as factors to determine what commodities to strategically source. 
3. Teams/Locations 
Qualitative responses to Q1, Q2 and Q3 
What criteria are used to determine the qualifications of core team 
members? 
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Are formal training materials available?  If yes, what are they and who 
developed them?  If no, what will they be, who will develop them, and 
when will they be available? 
One respondent did not address these questions.  Three respondents noted 
the core team members are taken from the location designated for the commodity 
council with no particular selection process.  Two respondents stated the contracting 
qualifications are inherent in the position (i.e., a warranted contracting officer is a 
warranted contracting officer).  The technical side of the house determines their 
members of that council.  These respondents all noted the location of the councils 
and CoEs are determined by which MAJCOM is willing to champion the effort.  In the 
first quarter of 2008, the first of several regional centers will be established 
throughout the Air Force.  Each of these regions will include a commodity council 
and CoE.  Two respondents stated there are no formal training materials currently 
available.  These respondents noted they are working with contractors and the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to develop these tools.  One respondent 
believed there is formal training, at least for contracting, in the DAU’s Commodity 
Council 101.  No respondents were aware of when these training materials would be 
available or who specifically would develop them.  All three respondents believe 
there is no training available for the technical side.   
4. Oversight 
Qualitative responses to Q1 
How is the Air Force ensuring the OMB initiatives are properly 
implemented? 
Only three interviewees responded to this question.  All stated these 
initiatives are being reported through annual reports to OMB.  One respondent noted 
there is a quarterly report submitted by all commodity councils to headquarters, and 
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Qualitative responses to Q2 
How is the Air Force ensuring “buy-in” at all levels (from the WG/CC to 
CSAF)? 
Only two respondents answered this question.  Both noted the council 
charters are signed at headquarters level, but sponsorship and use are determined 
at the commodity council level.  One respondent also noted, with the exception of 
AFITCC, there is no requirement to use these councils. 
Qualitative responses to Q3 
How is the effectiveness of each council tracked (i.e., matrices, 
reports)? 
One respondent noted there are a lot of different ways to report effectiveness.  
There is currently no established format for councils to follow.  One respondent 
stated there are no hard metrics to report. 
Qualitative responses to Q4 
What measures are in place to create/maintain cooperative relationships 
with contractors (i.e., opportunistic behavior, long-term relationships, 
bi-lateral monopoly, hostage taking)? 
Two respondents answered this question.  One stated these issues are not 
being addressed.  The other respondent believed these issues are being utilized on 
weapon systems, but relationships at the installation level are not understood or 
being addressed. 
Qualitative responses to Q5 
Is the overall strategy of commodity councils still on track with initial 
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Only two respondents answered this question.  Both believed the commodity 
councils are achieving expectations, but thought if the workforce understood 
strategic sourcing, progress would be faster and more expansive. 
5. Future 
Qualitative responses to Q1 
Do you see these commodity councils permeating down to the lowest 
levels within the Air Force?  If not, what level is the lowest appropriate? 
One respondent noted not all commodities require a council to achieve 
effective strategic sourcing.  Some of these commodities can still be strategically 
sourced at the installation, or tactical, level.  The other respondents all noted this 
effort would not, and should not, be permeated down to lower levels.  These 
respondents all believed strategic sourcing opportunities are moving up from the 
tactical level to regional levels, then enterprise-wide, and finally to the joint level.  
Qualitative responses to Q2 and Q3 
What makes those commodity councils that have been successful a 
success? 
What characteristics are common among those councils that have 
failed?    
Two respondents believed a successful council has dedicated teams and 
buy-in from all communities.  One respondent noted the key to success was making 
the commodity council a mandatory vehicle.  Failure was seen by two respondents 
due to lack of dedicated manning.  Respondents felt it imperative that there be no 
part-time or vacant positions on the team.  One respondent noted several other 
issues associated with failure.  One issue was if the spend level is not enough to 
garner support, the effort will not receive the attention or manning it requires.  The 
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benefit the communities that utilize them, and how they help the Air Force optimize 
resource allocation. 
E. INTERVIEW RESPONSES FOR COMMODITY COUNCIL 
LEVEL 
The results of the interviews revealed characteristics common to all three 
commodity councils.  Common responses demonstrate little evidence of utilizing 
lessons learned from previous councils.  Based on these responses, there appears 
to be a trend of non-uniformity and an established need for continued improvement 
among commodity councils.  As previously noted, responses are presented 
generically and not attributable to specific individuals or positions.  Responses are 
discussed below. 
1. Plan 
Qualitative responses to Q1 
Are you aware of the Air Force Strategic Sourcing Plan?  If yes, are you 
aware of the organizational structure outlined in the plan? 
Seven respondents were aware of the Air Force Strategic Sourcing Plan.  Of 
those who were aware of the plan, six knew the organizational structure outlined in 
the plan. 
Qualitative responses to Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 
Did this commodity council have a documented plan outlining specific 
objectives? 
Was the plan available to all members of the team?  If yes, did all 
members agree with the plan? 
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Was the plan followed?  If not, why? 
All respondents stated their specific commodity council had a documented 
plan made available to all members.  One respondent noted there was a lot of 
discussion during the development of the plan, but consensus was eventually 
reached. Not all members were on the council during the initial phase when the plan 
was developed and could not provide insight.  The responses indicate there is no 
consensus on how the plans are designed.  Two respondents stated development of 
the plan was a combination of team members and contractors.  One individual 
stated it was benchmarked from a previous commodity council and adjusted to fit 
his/her council’s specific needs.  Three respondents noted the plan was created by 
all team members, but required assistance from higher levels for implementation.  
Six of the respondents felt the plan was being followed.  One assumed it was being 
followed, but was reluctant to commit to an answer.  One respondent stated it was 
being followed minimally, but there was a general lack of understanding among the 
members. 
2. Team Composition 
Qualitative responses to Q1, Q2, and Q3 
How many members were on the commodity council? 
How were members of this commodity council selected? 
Did the team encompass the proper areas of expertise required for this 
council? 
Answers to how many members were on the commodity council varied—not 
only across the three councils, but among individual members of each council.  
Members of one council gave responses that varied from seven to twelve members.  
Another council had responses ranging from five to seven.  Several of those 
responses didn’t know exactly who was considered a team member (i.e., contractors 
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were selected, one council’s members stated they were volunteered by their 
supervisor.  The respondents from another council stated its members were pulled 
from existing organizations at that location and assigned to the council.  The fully 
developed council’s members unanimously felt they had the proper mix of expertise.  
They did note they would have benefited by involving the MTFs earlier in the 
process. On the underdeveloped council, both the lessons learned and the sole 
respondent clearly show the proper expertise was not made available to the council.  
All members of the remaining council felt the proper expertise was represented; 
however, all members quantified their responses.  These responses indicated the 
need for more technical expertise, less contracting personnel, better small business 
involvement, and some dedicated legal support. 
Qualitative responses to Q4 and Q5 
Were all members full-time dedicated members to the council?  If not, 
did it hinder the process? 
Did the composition of the team change during the process (i.e., did all 
full-time members that started with the team end with the team?) 
Responses from one council all stated its members were dedicated full-time 
to the council with the exception of judge advocate members.  Respondents felt this 
did not hinder the team.  There were no full-time members dedicated to the 
underdeveloped council.  This hindered their progress and was a direct cause for the 
lack of success.  Responses from the other council were inconsistent.  One 
respondent believed all members were dedicated full-time to the council.  The 
remaining responses indicated there were no full-time dedicated members on the 
council.  One member felt part-time membership did hinder the team, while the 
remaining respondents felt it may have slowed them down, but did not hinder their 
progress.  They did feel it may interfere with achieving council objectives.  The 
emerging council has not yet dealt with composition changes.  The underdeveloped 
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composition changes, but not in the allocation of positions.  During source selections 
the team adds additional technical expertise. 
Qualitative responses to Q6 
What were the dynamics of this team?  Was each team member valuable 
and valued?  What authority did each member possess? 
All respondents from one council felt team dynamics were exceptionally 
productive, and all members felt empowered and valuable.  A respondent from a 
different council felt the team never left the storming phase and had a continual 
clash between the buying community and the customer.  All respondents of the final 
council felt each member was indeed valuable and empowered to perform his/her 
function.  The majority felt the team had normal group dynamics, but did form a 
cohesive team.  One respondent noted there were standard conflicts between the 
legal and contracting functions.  This individual also felt there was a power struggle 
between the warranted contracting officers, which were assigned from different 
organizations. 
3. Training 
Qualitative responses to Q1 
Did members of the team receive/already possess solid understanding 
of the strategic sourcing initiatives and the Air Force vision to achieve 
these initiatives? 
All respondents felt the answer to this question was no.  Two respondents 
stated they took on-line training and attended a two-day training course offered by a 
contractor.   
Three respondents stated SAF/AQC provided information, and members 
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(ACE).  One respondent stated no one understood anything and characterized the 
environment as chaotic.  
Qualitative responses to Q2 and Q3 
Did individuals possess the correct skill sets for their role within the 
team?  If not, was additional training required? 
If additional training was required, how was it accomplished? 
One council’s members unanimously agreed that they all possessed the 
correct skills; but then contradicted their response by stating all members were 
taking commodity council specific on-line DAU classes and would be contracting for 
further commodity council training in the future.  One council stated the correct skills 
sets were not present, and necessary training was not provided.  Respondents from 
the final council provided mixed responses.  One felt the council members absolutely 
had the correct skill sets.  One felt they had adequate skills and knew who to contact 
if they required additional guidance.  Three respondents offered a negative 
assessment.  Some respondents felt individuals needed further or refresher training.  
Several members were currently taking on-line DAU classes and attending in-
resident DAU courses.  In the past, several members visited a MAJCOM ACE for 
training, while others took a course offered by IBM.   
4. Process 
Qualitative responses to Q1 and Q2 
Was there an established process for each phase of the acquisition? 
(i.e., market research, available sources, evaluation criteria, selection 
process) 
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Responses varied across all three councils, and among individual members 
assigned to the same council.  Respondents who stated there were established 
processes nonetheless did not agree about what those processes entailed.  One 
respondent noted the process was fully laid out in the Commodity Acquisition 
Management Plan (CAMP).  Another believed some of the processes were clearly 
established, and other processes were identified as the council progressed.  A final 
respondent mistakenly thought the processes could be conducted concurrently as 
opposed to consecutively.  Everyone who believed his/her council had an 
established process believed the process was followed.   
Qualitative responses to Q3 and Q4 
Was relationship management an integral part of the decision-making 
process? 
What impact did transactional costs have in the process? 
The question regarding relationship management appeared to confuse almost 
every respondent.  Many respondents did not understand the question.  After further 
explanation, they still could not provide an answer.  Those who believed they 
involved relationship management in the decision-making process considered only 
the customer, not the supplier.  Responses indicate transaction costs were not 
considered by any of the councils.  
Qualitative responses to Q5 
Were best practices from industry or other commodity councils 
incorporated in the process? 
One council did not utilize any best practices in its process.  Of the other two 
councils, both used industry and other commodity council best practices.  One of the 
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5. Results 
Qualitative responses to Q1 and Q2 
Were the desired results of the commodity council achieved? 
How were the results measured? 
Responses from the underdeveloped council noted that only one contract 
action was completed, but desired results were never achieved.  No measurable 
results were identified.  The emerging council is in the market research phase and 
has not yet been able to measure results.  Responses indicate dollars saved will be 
the criterion for determining if the council is a success.  All respondents from this 
council believe they need full-time dedicated people to the effort and proper support 
from upper echelons within the Air Force to achieve desired results.  The fully 
developed council had differing responses.  Two respondents believed desired 
results had been achieved.  Two other respondents believed they were on the right 
path to achieving desired results.  One respondent did not believe his/her council 
had achieved desired results, but did think it was getting closer.  All respondents 
gave different answers to how the results are measured.  The first response noted it 
was based on how many contracts were in place and how many task orders had 
been placed against those contracts.  The second respondent believed the council 
had no measurements and was using procurement acquisition lead time as the 
measurement.  Another stated it was based on how responsive the contractor was to 
the needs of the customer.  Yet another response indicated it was based on the 
contractor providing and maintaining qualified personnel, minimizing turnover, and 
overall customer satisfaction.  The final respondent stated his/her council could not 
yet gauge cost savings, but could measure cost avoidance based on what was 
allocated in the Air Force budget for that effort. 
6. Additional Question 
At the end of each interview, respondents were asked a question not 
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or would make, the commodity councils successful.  An overwhelming response 
among all three councils and all respondents was that senior-level support and buy-
in to the council, full-time, dedicated team members, and the correct number and 
composition of expertise brought in at the proper time in the process would promote 
success.  Other respondents also noted customer buy-in at all levels.  Four 
respondents noted a visionary leader was critical to the success of the council.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the commodity councils chosen for this research 
project.  The information was presented by examining the responses to each of the 
questionnaires individually.  This allowed the data not only to be broken out by topic, 
but responses to be compared within a homogeneous framework.  The next chapter 
presents the analysis of the interview responses.  It also addresses the findings by 
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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the collected data and 
our research findings.  Comparison of the perspectives in policy-making 
organizations and policy-implementing organizations are also undertaken.   
B. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
In the course of this project, numerous findings and patterns emerged from 
the data collected.  We analyzed the data to help establish a roadmap for successful 
implementation of commodity councils.  We focused on four key areas from a 
headquarters perspective and four key areas from a commodity council perspective.  
The analysis below is broken out by each level and discussed in detail. 
1. Headquarters 
a. Implementation 
Implementing any new plan or procedure requires extensive coordination to 
ensure the objectives of the plan are being achieved.  The Air Force developed the 
SSP as an overarching sourcing strategy.  The data confirms this plan was 
developed and subsequently distributed through the MAJCOMs.  However, 
development and dissemination of a plan are not enough to ensure a 
comprehensive understanding, implementation strategy, and rationale for use by 
those tasked to actualize the plan. IG 5307.104-93 was developed in the AFFARS to 
provide a framework for implementing commodity councils.  The data clearly shows 
those individuals who are supposed to know the intricate workings and development 
of commodity councils do not have a clear cut understanding of the purpose and 
intent of the IG.  Even at this high level, there is disagreement as to the exact role 
the IG renders in standing up a commodity council.  Is the IG guidance or is it really 
policy?  Is it step-by-step procedure or a baseline tool?  The data shows no 
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understanding of strategic sourcing at the implementation levels is not possible 
without first having unambiguous agreement about how to disseminate, implement, 
and use the plan and guidance from the top levels. 
b. Buy-In 
As noted by numerous sources (Ellram & Carr, 1994; Oberoi & Khamba, 
2005; Rajagopal & Bernard, 1993; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001), obtaining support 
throughout all levels of an organization is imperative to the success of strategic 
sourcing.  Even more crucial is getting support from the highest levels of all 
organizations affected by the process.  These organizations include the buying 
activity, the user community, the supplier community, and all supporting activities.  
These communities must agree on the roles and responsibilities each community will 
assume, as well as how the vehicle will be used.  The data highlights that it is 
imperative to receive support from the highest levels within these organizations to 
achieve success.  The fact that no processes are mandated from the top levels 
directly contradicts the notion of buy-in from these levels.  Commodity councils are 
left to find sponsorship and determine the extent the council will be utilized with no 
top-level support.  Our finding is without this support at the beginning of the effort, 
these councils face an uphill battle.  This makes them susceptible to inefficient use 
of resources, bureaucratic red tape, stagnation, and possibly, overall failure. 
c. Factors 
Academic literature and industry offer some of the criteria for strategic 
sourcing decisions include relationship management, transaction cost analysis, 
industry analysis, supply and demand forecasting, sustained competitive advantage, 
requirement analysis, supplier competence, supplier capability and capacity, and 
spend analysis (IOMA, 2003; IOMA, 2005; Murray et al., 1995; Narasimhan & Das, 
1999; Newhart, 2006; Oberoi & Khamba, 2005; Smock, 2004).  This project’s data 
clearly shows the only factor being used to make strategic sourcing decisions in the 
Air Force is spend data.  With the exception of weapon systems, none of the other 
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Air Force commodities.  The research finding suggests the Air Force has severely 
handicapped its strategic sourcing opportunities by examining spend as the only 
factor in decision-making.  Looking only at spend data will limit the Air Force’s ability 
to leverage its resources to the maximum extent. 
d. Qualifications and Training 
Analysis of the data denotes there are no pre-requisites or mandated 
competencies in place for personnel who serve on commodity councils.  As there 
are no established qualifications, only limited training is available for acquisition 
personnel, and no training is available for technical personnel.  Lack of requisite 
skills and knowledge to understand strategic sourcing and its implementation 
hinders the councils from performing optimally.  Although strategic sourcing, by its 
very name, implies the ability to look beyond the tactical level, our findings indicate 
the Air Force is not achieving its objective at the tactical level, and definitely not at a 
strategic level.  The general disregard for ensuring the most qualified personnel are 
identified and assigned to the council lessens effectiveness throughout the process.  
The lack of training for team members, once identified and in place, further inhibits 
the chances of the council being successful.    
2. COMMODITY COUNCILS 
a. Implementation 
Analysis of the data indicates that although most respondents were aware of 
the SSP and the IG, few knew how these documents were incorporated into, or 
pertained to, their commodity council.  The data shows there were no specific 
processes for developing the individual plans of the specific councils; all three 
councils developed their plans differently.  With no template to follow, several 
councils sought assistance from other councils, contractors, and industry best 
practices.  The data further reveals processes for each phase of the acquisition 
varied from phase to phase and council to council.  Again, it was apparent to the 
researchers there is no template or specific procedure available for members to 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 50- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
next phase.  Lack of templates and procedural guidance has put the councils in a 
precarious dilemma.  How are the implementers supposed to proceed successfully 
with no set standard, policy or guidance? 
b. Team Composition and Manning 
Data analysis revealed selection criteria for core team members was 
ambiguous even to the team members themselves.  In addition, personnel had 
difficulty identifying the actual number of team members assigned.  These 
discrepancies highlight an obvious disconnect between alignment and allotment of 
personnel.  The analysis suggests an overall imbalance of specialties (i.e., 
contracting, legal, technical, and financial).  Some councils appeared heavy in 
contracting, but light in technical expertise.  Others began heavy on technical and 
light on contracting, but brought additional contracting support on much later in the 
process.  The data further revealed the teams were assembled in an impromptu 
fashion.  Rather than finding the right people for the council, people were 
“volunteered” or randomly picked from other organizations.  This type of selection 
process led members to dedicate only part of their time to the council, while still 
maintaining other responsibilities.  All councils had some core team members on a 
part-time status for at least some, if not all, of the process.  We believe little thought 
is put into the team composition required for successful implementation of strategic 
sourcing within the Air Force.  The lack of planning and forethought in this area has 
severely hampered business practices and paved the way for these councils to fail. 
c. Training 
All respondents felt those assigned to the commodity councils did not have 
requisite training and expertise to fulfill the task assigned.  The analysis strongly 
indicated the members did not have a firm grasp of Air Force strategic sourcing 
initiatives or of their respective roles as members.  Although all respondents felt they 
possessed some specialty skills required to perform their function; every member 
was taking some form of additional training, whether it was on-line, in-residence, or 
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Force does not train like it fights.  If senior leadership fails to provide the necessary 
tools for team members to feel confident, the council will not be successful. 
d. Measurement of Success 
The data collected indicates there are no set standards against which to 
measure the success or failure of a commodity council.  No two respondents had the 
same response for how the success of the council was determined.  Analysis 
indicates that in one council, both quantitative and qualitative methods were noted 
as means of measurement.  It was also unclear to respondents what measurements, 
if any, were reported to headquarters.  Our finding is that without clear guidance, it is 
impossible to reliably gauge a council’s success.   
Clear measurements allow team members to see and assess their progress, 
weaknesses and strengths in order to improve their processes and performance.   
C. PERSPECTIVE COMPARISON 
In order to analyze this data in a truly useful way, it is important to examine 
the policy-making and policy-implementing perspectives side-by-side.  This is critical 
for a comprehensive understanding of the data presented.  In many instances, both 
sides identified the same issues; however, there were times when they had different 
perspectives. 
Both sides identified implementation as a deficiency.  The lack of 
understanding of the plans and guidance at the strategic level hinders the actual 
implementation at the tactical level.  If the senior leadership does not possess the 
needed expertise, it is unreasonable to expect that knowledge to be transmitted to 
lower levels. 
Training was also identified by both sides as needing improvement.  Strategic 
sourcing is changing the way the Air Force performs its procurement function.  The 
headquarters clearly believe the acquisition work force requires educational training 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 52- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
as they have no clear understanding of how strategic sourcing affects their activities 
and the benefits of this approach.  Headquarters’ staffs are  also trying to address 
the need to formally train members of commodity councils.  Currently, there is 
minimal training available for acquisition personnel; moreover, this training is not 
mandatory or readily available.  In addition, there is no formal training for any other 
functional specialties assigned to commodity councils.  The commodity council 
members all recognize the need for this training. 
Success factors, as indicated by both sides, were top-level buy-in, correct 
composition of teams, and full-time, dedicated members.  Headquarters also felt it 
was important to have the appropriate level of spend to support a council, education 
and training, and mandatory use of the contractual vehicle.  The commodity council 
members also thought it was important to have visionary leadership and senior-level 
support to ensure success.     
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the research team’s analysis of the data and the 
subsequent findings.  The analysis was broken out and examined at the policy-
making level and at the policy-implementation level.  The top findings were 
discussed within each level.  The research team also addressed several 
comparisons between these two levels within Air Force strategic sourcing.  The next 
chapter will address the research team’s recommendations, as well as the limitations 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide overall recommendations.  It will 
address this project’s limitations and identify areas to be considered for future 
research within commodity councils and strategic sourcing.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The researchers offer the following recommendations based on the literature 
review, data collection and analysis, and our personal observations.  The 
recommendations are meant to provide the Air Force with a roadmap to achieve 
greater success in strategic sourcing.  The research team presents its 
recommendations in order of importance. 
The most significant obstacle for the Air Force to overcome, in the arena of 
strategic sourcing, is proper implementation.  The Air Force needs to determine if 
IG5307.104-93, Commodity Council Implementation and Operations, is indeed a 
guide, or if it is a policy.  We conclude the ambiguity of the guide lends itself to 
misinterpretation of its actual intent.  We also conclude that effectively implementing 
strategic sourcing through commodity councils entails more top-down direction—
including useful templates.  Some templates necessary are council organization, 
team structure, and a format for the charter and CAMP.  Specific and uniform 
measurements of success, and their reporting, also need to be established.  After 
the policy is clearly defined, implementation needs to include disseminating the 
information from the highest echelons to the lowest levels.  The previous form of 
mass communication dissemination has clearly not reached implementation and 
user levels.  Our recommendation is to develop a “road show” presentation.  These 
teams of experts should travel from base to base and unit to unit.  The purpose of 
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provide a specific framework that includes implementation, available resources, 
training materials, and specialized points of contact.   
Our next area of concern is determining what commodities to strategically 
source.  Currently, the Air Force only considers spend in this determination.  Best 
practices, and much of the literature on strategic sourcing, indicate there are many 
factors that can, and should, be used in making these decisions.  We recommend 
these other factors be used in making this determination.  Such factors include 
supplier relationship, transaction cost analysis, supplier and buyer compatibility, total 
life-cycle costs, and requirements analysis.  An additional DoD-specific factor that 
must be considered is small business mandates.  
The third issue that needs to be addressed is buy-in.  Currently, headquarters 
expect individual commodity councils to garner the necessary support for success.  
Once pertinent factors have been considered, then buy-in from the highest levels of 
all functional areas must be obtained.  In the course of this research, two cases were 
identified in which the user community drove the need for a commodity council—
without including the acquisition community until after the council was established.  
This practice is in direct conflict with the IG.  This document outlines the order of 
events.  These events are: determination of a CoE, selection of a director and 
deputy, selection of the commodity strategy officials, concurrent selection and 
training of the team members, development of the charter, and an official beginning 
of council operations.  It is also our recommendation these decisions be made at the 
appropriate levels within the Air Force and implemented downward, not the other 
way around. 
Qualifications and team-member training are the final area of concern.  The 
first area that needs to be addressed is team-member selection.  Inclusion on the 
council should be based on proper qualifications and expertise, not on who happens 
to be available from the established council location.  Selection could, and should, 
be accomplished at the buy-in stage.  Choosing the commodities and their location 
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members.   A comprehensive training program is also needed for all commodity 
councils and their members.  This training program should be an integrated 
approach with all areas of training necessary for every team member.  This method 
of training will ensure there is cross-flow between functional areas.  It would also 
establish a comprehensive understanding into the roles and responsibilities of each 
individual team member.  Completion of a comprehensive training program should 
result in professional certification and special coding with the individual’s Air Force 
Specialty Code.  Similar coding for space professionals made that designation highly 
desired in the space community. 
C. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
Limitations are inherent in all research—especially time.  This project was no 
exception.  Time constrained our efforts in two ways. First, there was a specific 
deadline for completion.  Second, the window of opportunity to access interviewees 
posed limitations, including availability and travel opportunities. 
Accordingly, project scope was limited to one strategic sourcing method: 
commodity councils.  Scope was further refined to include only Air Force commodity 
councils.  The number of commodity councils available within the Air Force is finite.  
This resulted in limiting the scope to three commodity councils.  This approach 
ensured the topic was adequately addressed within the time constraints, but it is 
possible results could vary with other councils. 
Funding limitations were also an issue.  This program was funded by the 
Acquisition Research Program (ARP).  This program funded travel to commodity 
council and headquarters locations to conduct interviews.  However, travel to all 
locations was not possible.  We were forced to choose which locations to visit, and 
which locations could be contacted by other means—telephone and e-mail.   
This research used a qualitative approach.  We employed open-ended 
questions to collect data.  This approach has inherent limitations.  Since there is no 
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ended questions and responses make it impossible to create a baseline answer for 
comparison, as is common in quantitative analysis.  The answers were analyzed and 
compared to strategic sourcing literature and theory.  This brings us to the final 
limitation of this research. 
There is an abundance of strategic sourcing literature available.  This 
literature is primarily focused on how strategic sourcing is implemented, achieved, 
and measured in industry.  As this research project focused on the public sector, the 
basis for comparison was limited.     
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Commodity councils were recently introduced in the public sector.  With OMB 
mandates requiring strategic sourcing initiatives from all agencies, the Air Force has 
decided to use commodity councils to satisfy these requirements.  During this 
inquiry, several areas for additional research were identified.  Currently, the Air 
Force only utilizes spend data in strategic sourcing determinations.  Future research 
should examine other data and business best practices the Air Force needs to 
incorporate in the decision process.  Another area for future research is strategic 
sourcing opportunities within the Air Force.  As noted earlier, commodity councils are 
just one method of implementing strategic sourcing.  Future research should 
address other strategic sourcing approaches to achieve these objectives.  Regional 
centers may be a better method for strategic sourcing; however, only time and future 
research will provide the answers. 
The focus of this research was strictly limited to the application of strategic 
sourcing within the Air Force.  As previously discussed, the current Air Force vision 
is to raise the level of implementation to the enterprise level.  This vision encourages 
the examination of joint strategic sourcing opportunities.  There are joint programs 
already in place.  Further study could identify new opportunities and determine the 
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Our final recommendation for future research is the use of commodity 
councils at the unit level.  Are these contractual vehicles are being utilized to their 
fullest extent?  If not, is success dependent on the location and size of the bases, 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 59- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Air force contracting strategic plan fiscal years 2006-2007. (2005). Strategic Plan. 
Retrieved April 26, 2007, from 
https://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/contracting/public/about-us/af-strat-plan.pdf 
Ausink, J. A., Baldwin, L. H., & Paul, C. (2004). Air force procurement workforce 
transformation lessons from the commercial sector. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation. 
Avery, S. (1999). Brunswick saves big bucks by centralizing services buy. 
Purchasing, 126(4), 38-41. 
Bearden, B., & Morton, A. (2006). A road map for federal strategic sourcing. Public 
Manager, 35(1), 34-39.  
Burt, D. N. (1989). Managing product quality through strategic purchasing. Sloan 
Management Review, 30(3), 39-48.  
Callender, G., & Matthews, D. (2000). Government purchasing: An evolving 
profession? Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial 
Management, 12(2), 272-290.  
Caporal, J. (2006). Air Force strategic sourcing and small business. Slideshow 
Briefing. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from https://acc.dau.mil 
Carr, A. S., & Pearson, J. N. (2002). The impact of purchasing and supplier 
involvement on strategic purchasing and its impact on firm’s performance. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 22(9/10), 
1032-1053.  
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405.  
Dennett, P. A. (2006). Memorandum for heads of executive departments and 
agencies report to congress on FY 2006 competitive sourcing efforts 
(Memorandum No. M-01-01). Retrieved April 26, 2007, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-01.pdf 
DoD-wide strategic sourcing program concept of operations. (2005). Unpublished 
manuscript. Retrieved April 26, 2007, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/strategicsourcing/ 
Dupray, C. P. (2005). The coming transformation: Contracting organizations as 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 60- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
Ellram, L. M. (1995). A managerial guideline for the development and 
implementation of purchasing partnerships. International Journal of 
Purchasing and Materials Management, 31(2), 9-16. 
Ellram, L. M., & Carr, A. (1994). Strategic purchasing: A history and review of the 
literature. International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, 
30(2), 10-19.  
Else, S. E. (2002). Strategic sourcing and federal government transformation. 
Information Knowledge Systems Management, 3, 31-52.  
FarSite contracting laboratory Hill AFB. (2006). Retrieved July 28, 2006, from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil  
Franck, R. (2004). Business case analysis and contractor vs. organic support: A 
first-principles view. (Research Paper). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Gillen, J. (2006). Purchasing and supply chain management: Commodity council 
concept. Contract Management, 46, 34-38.  
Handfield, R. B., Krause, D. R., Scannell, T. V., & Monczka, R. M. (2000). Avoid the 
pitfalls in supplier development. MIT Sloan Management Review, 41, 37-49.  
Hobbs, J. E. (1996). A transaction cost approach to supply chain management. 
Supply Chain Management, 1(2), 15-27.  
IOMA. (2003). 15 steps to transform purchasing into strategic sourcing. Supplier 
Selection & Management Report, 3, 6-7,11.  
IOMA. (2005). Create an effective strategic sourcing process in 8 steps. Supplier 
Selection & Management Report, 5, 1-15. 
Irvine, R. J. (2005). A qualitative study of industry and air force commodity council 
processes. (Thesis for Master of Science in Cost Analysis, Air Force Institute 
of Technology). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology.  
Jennings, D. (2002). Strategic sourcing: Benefits, problems and a contextual model. 
Management Decision, 40(1/2), 26-34.  
Johnson, C. (2005). Memorandum implementing strategic sourcing. Retrieved May 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 61- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Kaufman, A., Wood, C. H., & Theyel, G. (2000). Collaboration and technology 
linkages: A strategic supplier typology. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 
649-663.  
Kocabasoglu, C., & Suresh, N. C. (2006). Strategic sourcing: An empirical 
investigation of the concept and its practices in U.S. manufacturing firms. 
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 42(2), 4-16.  
Lorenz, S. (n.d.). US Air Force, FY05 budget. Slideshow Briefing Retrieved May 10, 
2007, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2005/usaf/ 
FY05_Budget_Rollout.ppt#1903, 1, U.S. 
Matthews, D. (2005). Strategic procurement in the public sector: A mask for financial 
and administrative policy. Journal of Public Procurement, 5(3), 388-399.  
Monczka, R. M., Trent, R., & Handfield, R. (2005). In J.W. Calhoun, G. Werthman, 
C.  McCormick & T. Wilkins (Eds.), Purchasing and supply chain 
management (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: South-Western Publishing, Thomson 
Learning. 
Murray, J. Y. (2001). Strategic alliance-based global sourcing strategy for 
competitive advantage: A conceptual framework and research propositions. 
Journal of International Marketing, 9, 30-58.  
Murray, J. Y., Kotabe, M., & Wildt, A. R. (1995). Strategic and financial performance 
implications of globals. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(1), 181-
204.  
Narasimhan, R., & Das, A. (1999). An empirical investigation of the contribution of 
strategic sourcing to manufacturing flexibilities and performance. Decision 
Sciences, 30, 683-718.  
Newhart, J. F. (2006). Strategic sourcing: What's all the buzz about? Contract 
Management, 46(1), 26-31.  
Oberoi, J. S., & Khamba, J. S. (2005). Strategically managed buyer-supplier 
relationships across supply chain: An exploratory study. Human Systems 
Management, 24, 275-283.  
Olorunniwo, F., & Hartfield, T. (2001). Strategic partnering when the supply base is 
limited: A case study. Industrial Management + Data Systems, 101(1), 47-52.  
Paulraj, A., & Chen, I. J. (2005). Strategic supply management and dyadic quality 
performance: A path analytical model. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 62- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Polonsky, M. J., & Waller, D. S. (2005). Designing and managing a research project. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Rajagopal, S., & Bernard, K. N. (1993). Cost containment strategies: Challenges for 
strategic purchasing in the 1990s. International Journal of Purchasing and 
Materials Management, 29(1), 17-24.  
Reese, D. L., & Pohlman, D. W. (2005). Centralized purchasing power: Why air force 
leadership should care. Air Force Journal of Logistics, 29(1), 2-13.  
Reese, D. M., & Hansen, M. C. (2003). Commodity council concept of operations. 
Retrieved April 26, 2007, from https://acc.dau.mil 
Report to Office of Management and Budget implementation of strategic sourcing 
initiatives. (2006). Retrieved April 26, 2007, from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/dbt/products/strategic_sourcing_012706.pdf 
Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997). Transaction cost analysis: Past, present, and 
future applications. Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30-54.  
Rogin, J. (2006). A few good partners: Air Force information technology commodity 
council aims to be a model of strategic sourcing. Federal Computer Week, 
20(32), 19-24. 
Rossetti, C., & Choi, T. Y. (2005). On the dark side of strategic sourcing: 
Experiences from the aerospace industry. Academy of Management 
Executive, 19, 46-60.  
SAF/AQC. (2005). "Strategic sourcing: Back to basics" briefing, [acquisition 
community connection]. Retrieved May 15, 2007, from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=46199  
Schoonmaker, J., & Osborn, R. (2007). Competitive market model vs. keiretsu 
model (Research Paper). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.  
Simpson, P. M., Siguaw, J. A., & White, S. C. (2002). Measuring the performance of 
suppliers: An analysis of evaluation processes. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management: A Global Review of Purchasing & Supply, 38, 29-41.  
Smock, D. (2004). Strategic sourcing: It's now deeply rooted in U.S. buying. 
Purchasing, 133(1), 15-16.  
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of 
contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261.  
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 63- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Williamson, O. E. (1989). Transaction cost economics. In R. Schamalensee & R. 
Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (Vol. 1) (pp. 135-182). New 
York: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 
Wolf, H. (2005). Making the transition to strategic purchasing. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 46(4), 17-20.  
Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The formation of buyer-supplier relationships: 
Detailed contract drafting and close partner selection. Journal of Marketing, 
69, 103-117.  
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
Zsidisin, G. A., Eliram, L. M., & Ogden, J. A. (2003). The relationship between 
purchasing and supply management's perceived value and participation in 
strategic supplier cost management activities. Journal of Business Logistics, 
24, 129-154.  
Zsidisin, G. A., & Ellram, L. M. (2001). Activities related to purchasing and supply 
management involvement in supplier alliances. International Journal of 



















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 65- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR 
COMMODITY COUNCILS 
**Any material gathered for the purposes of this study will be held in confidence and 
only used in an academic environment.  Personnel names and identifiers will not be 
disclosed in research documents. 
PLAN 
1. Are you aware of the Air Force Strategic Sourcing Plan?  If yes, are 
you aware of the organizational structure outlined in the plan? 
2. Did this commodity council have a documented plan outlining specific 
objectives? 
4. Was the plan available to all members of the team?  If yes, did all 
members agree with the plan? 
5. Was the plan designed by the team members or instituted at a higher 
level? 
6. Was the plan followed?  If not, why? 
TEAM COMPOSITION 
1. How many members were on the commodity council? 
2. How were members of this commodity council selected? 
3. Did the team encompass the proper areas of expertise required for this 
council? 
4. Were all members full-time dedicated members to the council?  If not, 
did it hinder the process? 
5. Did the composition of the team change during the process (i.e., did all 
full-time members that started with the team end with the team?) 
7. What were the dynamics of this team?  Was each team member 
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TRAINING 
1. Did members of the team receive/already possess solid understanding 
of the strategic sourcing initiatives and the Air Force vision to achieve 
these initiatives? 
2. Did individual possess the correct skill sets for their role within the 
team?  If not, was additional training required? 
3. If additional training was required, how was it accomplished? 
PROCESS 
1. Was there an established process for each phase of the acquisition? 
(i.e., market research, available sources, evaluation criteria, selection 
process) 
2. Was the process followed?  If not, what was done differently? 
4. Was relationship management an integral part of the decision-making 
process? 
5. What impact did transactional costs have in the process? 
6. Were best practices from industry or other commodity councils 
incorporated in the process? 
RESULTS 
1. Were the desired results of the commodity council achieved? 
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APPENDIX B.INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR 
SAF/AQC 
**Any material gathered for the purposes of this study will be held in confidence and 
only used in an academic environment.  Personnel names and identifiers will not be 
disclosed in research documents. 
OMB INITIATIVE 
1. As a public organization, is the Air Force capable of implementing 
Strategic Sourcing the same way as industry?  If not, how is the Air 
Force approach different? 
2. How did the Air Force come up with its initiatives to meet OMB 
directive? 
3. Are the current initiatives different from the initial ones?  If not, why? 
PLAN 
1. How was the Air Force Strategic Sourcing Plan (SSP) developed? 
2. How is IG5307.104-93 (Commodity Council Implementation and 
Operations) used in the development of commodity councils? 
4. What method of implementation was used to deliver the SSP? 
5. Were community best practices, both public and private, considered in 
developing the plan? 
6. What factors were used to determine which commodities were going to 




1. What criteria are used to determine the qualifications of core team 
members? 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 68- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
3. Are formal training materials available?  If yes, what are they and who 
developed them?  If no, what will they be, who will develop them, and 
when will they be available? 
OVERSIGHT 
1. How is the Air Force ensuring the OMB initiatives are properly 
implemented? 
2. How is the Air Force ensuring “buy-in” at all levels (from the WG/CC to 
CSAF)? 
4. How is the effectiveness of each council tracked (i.e., matrices, 
reports)? 
5. What measures are in place to create/maintain cooperative 
relationships with contractors (i.e., opportunistic behavior, long-term 
relationships, bi-lateral monopoly, hostage taking)? 
6. Is the overall strategy of commodity councils still on track with initial 
expectations?  Savings?  Manpower?   
FUTURE 
1. Do you see these commodity councils permeating down to the lowest 
levels within the Air Force?  If not, what level is the lowest appropriate? 
2. What makes those commodity councils that have been successful a 
success? 
3. What characteristics are common among those councils that have 
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APPENDIX C.COMPETITIVE MARKET VS. 
KEIRETSU 
Competitive Market Model 
In order for a market to be considered competitive the following characteristics must 
be present:  (Cautionary Note: these characteristics are assumptions of the 
competitive market model but are not necessarily indicative of real world events.)   
 There are many buyers and sellers within the market, therefore each 
individual buyer or seller has no significant impact on the market price.  This 
means that both buyers and sellers are then “price takers”. 
 Goods and services are relatively the same across the marketplace. 
 All buyers and sellers have perfect information in regards to the prices set by 
each individual seller. 
 All sellers have access to the same technology. 
 All resources are considered perfectly mobile. (7, Wikipedia, Perfect 
Competition) 
Within a competitive market the goal of each individual seller is to maximize profits.  
This is true in the short-run or the long-run.  Each seller will choose to produce the 
amount that gives them the greatest amount of profit.  Sellers have power to decide 
the production amount but not the market price as they are all price takers. 
In both the short run and long run models, based on economic processes not delved 
into here, the Marginal Cost curve is considered to be upward sloping and the 
Average Total Cost Curve (ATC) is u-shaped and the curves cross at the minimum 
of the ATC.  (1, Mankiw) 
Short Run Competitive Market 
In the short run as long as Marginal Revenue (MR) exceeds Marginal Cost (MC) 
then the sellers increase the quantity produced in order to have increasing profits.  
(1, Mankiw) So in essence if MR > MC then the seller will increase production and if 
MR < MC then the seller will decrease production.  In the short run it is possible for 
the individual sellers to realize profits as seen in Exhibit 1. 
Long Run Competitive Market 
In the long run due to the fact that sellers can enter and exit the marketplace at their 
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profits” until an equilibrium is reached and all sellers have reached zero profits.  This 
zero profit definition is based on economic profits which include opportunity costs, 
and is not based on accounting profits, as accounting profits will be positive rather 
than zero. (1, Mankiw) 
The price which is set by the market is equal to Marginal Revenue (MR) which is 
equal to Average Revenue (AR) as seen in Exhibit 2.   
The long run market begins in equilibrium with the individual sellers at zero profit.  
The demand will increase which will raise the price, this will lead to short-run profits 
but with available profits come new firms to capitalize on those profits, so the price 
will fall and the equilibrium of zero profits will again be met.  (1, Mankiw) 
Keiretsu Model 
History 
Keiretsu, the Japanese form of corporate organization, began during the Meiji period 
(1868-1912).  Four large “zaibatsu”, as they were referred, dominated during this 
era: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Yasuda, and Sumitomo. (4, Staffs)  These companies held 
controlling shares of subordinate companies and were based on family principles of 
hierarchy, loyalty and dependency.  The enormous size of the zaibatsu made them 
financially strong.  When the Japanese Government ran out of funds for major 
projects, it turned to the zaibatsus.  This government endorsed power allowed them 
to acquire competing businesses, or drive them out of business.  This resulted in 
powerful monopolies within any market they entered. 
After World War II, the Occupation Authorities imposed the Economic 
Deconcentration Law, making zaibatsu organizations illegal.  In 1952 the Japanese 
Government relaxed these constraints.  Many former zaibatsu companies 
reorganizing under pre-war practices as keiretsu or “linked group” (4, Staffs) 
Horizontal and Vertical Keiretsu 
Current keiretsu are classified in two categories, horizontal and vertical.  Horizontal 
keiretsu focuses on the relationships between companies and are headed by major 
banks.  They are dominated by six large groups: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, 
Sanwa, and DKB.  These banks provide funding to member organizations, hold 
equity positions within these companies, and pressure these companies to produce 
at a higher than normal profit maximization rate. (2, Weinstein) They also loan 
money outside the keiretsu, but at much higher interest rates proving once again, 
“membership has its privileges”.  One example is the Mitsui Group, with 26 members 
and 171 affiliates.  Stock ownership by the group encompasses 10% or more of all 
affiliates.  This model provides great power and control over the subordinate 
companies to the bank.  The Mitsui depiction of the horizontal keiretsu is shown in 
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portions of smaller entities in ring two and three.  It is also possible, and quite likely, 
those residing in ring two own portions in ring three, but the reverse is not possible.  
Vertical models, dominated by the electronic and automotive industries, are 
structured around industrial groups connecting manufacturers, part suppliers, 
wholesalers, and retailers. (6, Wikipedia, Keiretsu)  Vertical models are comprised of 
one very large “parent” company with hundreds, or even thousands, of smaller 
companies under it.  This model takes on a typical management, or pyramid, 
structure.  The Nissan example of a vertical keiretsu is shown in Exhibit 4.  In this 
model the “parent” company owns a percentage of all the companies under it.  This 
allows the top-tier organization to heavily influence the decisions of the lower-tiers.  
Short Run and Long Run 
In the economic short run the keiretsu was a great model.  Japanese recession in 
the 1990s, however, had disastrous long run effects on the model.  During this 
period decreased Yen values and large amounts of “bad” debt forced large banks to 
merge or go out of business.  One example of this is the merger of Sumitomo Bank 
and Mitsui bank, now known as Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation.  These 
mergers blurred the lines of control within the keiretsu and resulted in some 
companies outside the model, such as Sony, outperforming their counterparts. 
Although the Japanese keiretsu model has not been used outside of Japan, several 
businesses utilize a similar structure.  Alliances within the airline industry, such as 
Star Alliance, are examples.  Looking at the vertical keiretsu of Nissan (exhibit 4) 
and partnerships in Star Alliance (exhibit 5) shows similarities in the models.  Under 
this model there are large carriers (upper tier) and regional carriers (lower tier).  
Each leverages off this structure to benefit the alliance as a whole, rather than lose 
revenue to carriers outside the alliance. 
Competitive Model vs. Keiretsu Model 
The competitive model is structured so that all buyers and sellers reside within the 
model; this is not true of the keiretsu.  The keiretsu model only has competition 
among different keiretsu and this intense competition creates barriers to entry for 
individual firms outside the keiretsu.  Individual firms cannot enter the marketplace at 
will and also don’t have entry and exit into a keiretsu at will, thereby inhibiting 
competition amongst all possible sellers within the marketplace. 
In the competitive model both buyers and sellers are price takers.  The keiretsu 
model differs from this in that the buyers are price takers but the keiretsu firms are 
price makers.  This occurs due to the influence of the banks requiring the keiretsu 
firms to produce at a higher than normal profit maximization level.  This higher level 
of production means higher costs are generated and these costs are borne by the 
buyers with the price being dictated by the keiretsu firms.  In a competitive model the 
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the best price for both the buyer and the seller.  The keiretsu model will have a 
higher price than would naturally occur in a competitive market.  
Summary 
The differences between the two models basically equates to a collective good 
versus an individualistic good.  The keiretsu model is a symbiotic relationship within 
each individual keiretsu, in that the smaller companies reap the benefits of being a 
part of the keiretsu and the larger members reap the benefits that the smaller 
companies can provide to the overall process.  Both are better off inside the model; 
however it doesn’t necessarily make the buyer better off.  The competitive model in 
contrast betters the market as a whole with the individual buyers and sellers working 
in a push-pull type of relationship. This type of relationship creates equilibrium that is 
beneficial to both buyers and sellers 
Exhibit 1. Short Run Competitive Model  
(7, Wikipedia) 
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Exhibit 2 Long-run Competitive Model  
(“Perfect Competition,” 2007) 
 Marginal Costs is Equal to Average Costs which is equal to Marginal and 
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Mitsui Trust & Banking 
Mitsui Marine & Fire 
Mitsui Mutual 
Mitsui Petrochem Industry 
Ishikawajima-Harrima  
Heavy Industry 
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Exhibit 4. Nissan Group 
(Percentages indicate total ownership by Nissan Group) 
 
Exhibit 5. Airline Members 
Alliance Members as of January 2007 (4, Star Alliance) 
Air Canada Scandinavian Airlines 
Air New Zealand Singapore Airlines 
ANA South African Airways 
Asiana Airlines Spanair 
Austrian Swiss 
BMI TAP Portugal 
LOT Polish Airlines Thai 
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Seats 
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Kiriu Machine Mfg 






Industry – Rubber 
(25%) 




Industry – Car Trim 
(25%) 
Tosok Corporation 
– Precision Tools 
(49%) 
Fuji Univance – 
Transmissions 
(34%) 
Tsuchiya Mfg – 
Emissions Controls
(67%) 
UNISIA JECS – 
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Blue 1 Cathay Pacific 
Croatia Airlines Finnair 
Adria Airways Iberia 
Aer Lingus LAN 
American Airlines Qantas 
British Airways 
Associate Members 
Air Nostrum QantasLink 
AmericanConnection Sun-Air 
American Eagle Aeroflot 
BA Connect Aeromexico 
BMED Air France - KLM 
Comair Alitalia 
GB Airways Continental 
Jetconnect CSA Czech Airlines 
LAN Express Delta Air Lines 
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